Does democracy reward competence or popularity?

Written by Zofia Urbaniec
How are powers distributed under the rule of law, and should we fear incompetent politicians? Can democracy still produce good government if the voters choose leaders based on persuasion rather than expertise?
If you were to board a plane during a storm, would you rather it be controlled by a qualified pilot, or a fellow charismatic passenger, chosen in a democratic voting by all the others? If in aviation the answer is simple, why, in politics, do we willingly and completely legally put the power in the hands of a showman?
Contemporary democracy faces a few serious challenges. In the era of the attention economy and information noise, political success is more often determined by algorithms, reach, and simple emotions than by complex economic programs. The phenomenon of rational ignorance makes voters more likely to rely on heuristics and catchy slogans rather than deepening their knowledge. As a result, the democratic system has overwhelmingly begun to reward popularity, campaign skills, and manipulation, marginalizing hard competencies.
Does this mean we are doomed to government incompetence, and the only solution is introducing pure meritocracy? No. As contemporary thinkers note, rule exclusively by the “smartest” leads to elite hubris and deep social divisions. In a modern rule of law state, the golden mean involves securing the system from two sides. On one side, from the bottom, through civic education that immunizes voters against populism. On the other, from the top down, through institutional safeguards: the Montesquieuan separation of powers (including an independent judiciary) and a cool, professional civil service that stabilizes the state during electoral shocks.
To understand this defense mechanism, it is worth first looking at the classic critics of democracy, analyzing contemporary voting behaviors and the phenomenon of “celebrity politicians,” and then examining the institutions that protect the state from the chaos of populism.
An illustration of the argument, that democracy rewards only popularity of a given politician, and does not lead to the creation of a competent government, is to bring up the thought of Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (who was an Austrian thinker and advocated for absolutist monarchy). In his book “Liberty or Equality: The challenge of our times” claimed that democracy is based on a flawed myth of equality, which always leads to oppression and authoritarianism. He believed that competencies (knowledge, education, experience) are intentionally marginalized in a democracy in favor of flattering the “masses,” and ideology replaces common sense. Similarly, Plato wrote: “If you were sailing on a ship, who should steer it? Someone chosen by the passengers through a vote, or a qualified captain-navigator?”. This question, which I already referred to in the introduction, leads us to his exact conclusion: During the voting, the masses choose the most impressive candidate, not the most qualified one. Democracy, according to him, hands the helm over to the ignorant. What he advocated for was the rule of “philosopher-kings” – “epistocracy” , meaning “the rule of the wise”. Which made sense for him, because those in power, would be educated and qualified for the job, and not just perfectly trained demagogues, who can easily convince the audience.
But if we know that people who will lead our country are on the line – so the most important ship and the biggest structure of all – why do we still make the same choice and choose the politicians who had the loudest opinions or best presentations. This phenomenon is what political scientists call “rational ignorance”, a theory popularized by Anthony Downs and Ilya Somin. Study shows, that widespread political ignorance is a severe problem for modern democracy, as most voters lack basic knowledge about government and policy. For instance, only about a third of Americans can correctly name the three branches of the federal government. Furthermore, voters vastly misunderstand federal spending; they drastically overestimate the budget for foreign aid (believing it is 10 to 20 times its actual 1% share) while greatly underestimating the costs of massive entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare.
Ilya Somin emphasizes that this ignorance is not caused by stupidity or a lack of education, but rather by perfectly rational behavior. Because the odds of an individual vote deciding the outcome of a presidential election are roughly 1 in 60 million, voters intuitively realize that dedicating significant time and effort to learning about complex policies is not a rational use of their resources. And even when voters do acquire political information, they typically fail to evaluate it objectively, falling into a trap called “rational irrationality”. Because people usually consume political news for entertainment or to cheer on their favorite political “team,” much like sports fans do. Consequently, they tend to overvalue information that reinforces their pre-existing beliefs while ignoring or downplaying facts that contradict them. Voters who are highly informed and follow politics closely often display even more partisan bias and irrationality in their evaluations than average voters do.
The attention economy and rational ignorance lead to the phenomenon of celebrity politicians. Nowadays, often the winner is the one who breaks through with radical views, controversies, and putting on a show. These are the most effective methods for free airtime and internet reach. Scholar John Street suggests that political style is not just marketing, but a form of show business. Politicians must adopt specific “idiolects” (repertoires of voice, gesture, and expression) and adjust their performances depending on the media format, much like actors. A celebrity politician does not have to prove their competence, but that they “are one of us” and will “strike at the elites.”
The article “Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power” by Alfred Archer et al, examines, that what celebrities have, is “epistemic power”. It is defined as the influence an individual holds in their capacity as a knowledge-generating agent. It consists of two main abilities: the ability to influence what other people think, believe, and know, and the ability to enable or disable others from exerting their own epistemic influence (for example, by validating their testimony or discrediting them as “fake news”). The authors identify two primary sources of this power for celebrities: People, especially fans who feel a parasocial sense of “intimacy at a distance,” may blindly trust a celebrity’s endorsement on serious political or medical issues, thereby granting them unwarranted epistemic power. Even without inherent credibility, celebrities possess the immense power of capturing public attention. This attention allows them to provide a massive platform for their own ideas, redirect the public’s focus to other voices, and essentially set the political agenda by determining which issues the news media and the public prioritize.
The Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign is on of the clearest examples of using your popularity, money, and controversy to gain voters, or should I say “fans”. Trump overtook Hilary Clinton in all of the polls thanks to his radical and populist statements. In Trump’s case, his individual power completely eclipsed the Republican Party’s ability to shape its own narrative. The fact that a man with no prior political experience not only won the presidency, but was able to radicalize and completely take over the direction of a powerful party, starkly demonstrates how dangerous epistemic power can be when it escapes traditional mechanisms of control.
This narrative that politicians are in fact celebrities, who instead of embodying the sentiments of the audience, embodies the sentiment of the state, and the party, is strictly coherent with “competitive democracy”, theory by Joseph Schumpeter, who in his book, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, stated that democracy is not the rule of the people. It is simply a mechanism for selecting the government, in which elites (politicians) compete for the votes of a passive-reactive crowd. Voters do not make any decisions, but choose who will make them.
What seems like the logical solution to the ship-steering theory is either meritocracy or epistocracy. The difference is subtle, the first one considers someone competent who has already achieved something in life and proven themselves. What matters is what you can do. In this system, outstanding entrepreneurs, great organizers, longtime managers, or social leaders would rule. And the second one considers someone competent who can analyze data, understands state mechanisms, and has theoretical knowledge. What matters is what you know. In this system, professors, economists, sociologists, and analysts would rule (or have the deciding vote).
However it is not as simple as it looks like. The rule exclusively by the “smartest” leads to the hubris of the elites and the humiliation of the lower class and even deeper class division. This is the reason (apart from interfering with elementary rights of each citizen of modern democracy and equality) why educational census proposed so eagerly sometimes, is an even worse idea. If we create a system where only the smartest and most hardworking truly reach the top, they will gain a sense of absolute moral superiority, and the bottom of the social ladder will have to accept inferiority. Philosopher Michael Sandel points out the same problem in his book The Tyranny of Merit. The iron law of oligarchy will always work, and we would soon have the rule of the elite and not of the competent. The conclusion is that: societies strive for competence in theory but reject meritocracy in practice because it is elitist. People prefer to vote for politicians “like them,” even if they are less competent.
So the next question that strikes in my research is: How to increase the government’s competence while simultaneously not restricting voting rights. What seems ideal is “deliberative democracy”, and tackling the problem from the bottom up, by rasing societies awareness. It assumes that citizens would not only drop the ballot into the box but also consciously debated and could critically evaluate facts. It focuses on discussion, referendums, and civic education. An educated citizen recognizes eristic ploys (manipulation techniques in discussion) and populism. They are not satisfied with a politician “looking cool on Social Media” but ask where the money to fulfill promises will come from.
An american philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey wrote the book Democracy and Education in 1916. He claimed that democracy is not a political system; it is a way of life that must be constantly trained in schools through learning critical thinking and debate, not cramming dates by heart. In the era of fake news, an aware society can verify sources and does not succumb to panic or radical moods built by celebrity politicians. And if voters stop rewarding politicians for aggression and showmanship, campaigns will naturally begin to promote substance. Politics adapts to what the electoral market “buys.”
Currently, the best example of putting this into practice is Finland. The Finns introduced mandatory classes in media literacy into schools (from an early age). Children learn how to recognize fake news, how social media algorithms work, how politicians use statistics to manipulate, and how to distinguish fact from opinion. The result? Finnish society is considered the most resistant to disinformation in all of Europe. However we all are unfortunately are aware that introducing this systems in all of the modern democratic republics would take many years, if the projects were even ever started.
This is because large parties act to their own advantage, not to the advantage of the citizen. The article “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement” by Richard S. Katz and Peter says: The growing gap between parties and society, combined with the parties’ self-serving appropriation of state resources, has provoked unprecedented levels of popular mistrust and voter disaffection. This environment has fueled the rise of populist, anti-cartel parties that successfully exploit public anger toward the insulated political establishment. Ultimately, the authors warn that unless political parties can find a way to genuinely represent citizens rather than merely governing them, it will become increasingly difficult for them to legitimize their control over democratic institutions.
It is not in the interest of the majority of politicians and parties relying on emotions to raise a critically thinking, manipulation-resistant society. It is easier to govern a crowd that votes under the influence of fear or catchy slogans than a society that watches the authorities closely and asks difficult questions. The easiest way to mobilize voters is through fear of “the others.” Or convincing them to vote for the “minor evil.” As a result, public debate is reduced to personal attacks and parties de facto close off the political market, making it difficult for new movements to access funding or the media (acting like a market cartel). And that is when we completely lose the element of competence in democracy, we might even lose the element of democracy in democracy, as to no options of other parties.
Political duopoly is a severe threat. Breaking it by introducing “a third power”, a deciding vote is an an effective strategy to let fresh air into the system, push through difficult reforms, and preserve the element of competence. A new player who wants to break this system does not start with an established electorate based on fear. They must prove their usefulness substantively by proposing concrete solutions (competence) that the old parties avoid. They must prove their usefulness substantively by proposing concrete solutions (competence) that the old parties avoid. Introduction of new actors on the political stage forces established parties to return to debating arguments, not just emotions.
However, new players quickly realize that to survive in parliament, maintain structures, and win subsequent elections, they must start playing by the old, ruthless rules. Being “untainted” rarely lasts longer than one term. Therefore, changes in a party should occur in a 1, 2, 3, 4 system, which is the definition of a healthy multi-party system (which functions excellently in, e.g., the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries).
Karl Popper claimed that democracy is not only about electing the best or brightest, because such people rarely are politicians, and power corrupts them over time anyway. But the true power of democracy is that it allows citizens to get rid of the bad government without violence or bloodshed. Citizens only have real influence when the cards are reshuffled (elections and the formation of coalitions). Since we cannot fully control parties during their term, our most powerful disciplining tool is the real threat of firing them.
There is, however, one massive risks associated with rapid rotation of power in the 1, 2, 3, 4 system, which is called democratic myopia (short-sightedness). The first line of defense, following the spirit of Montesquieu’s classic separation of powers, is an independent judiciary. In a rule of law state, power is never concentrated in one pair of hands but relies on a system of checks and balances. Not even the most popular celebrity politician is above the law, and independent courts or tribunals act as a “fuse.” By introducing cool, legal competence into politics, they can block the government’s unconstitutional ideas, protecting minorities and the whole of society from a phenomenon that Alexis de Tocqueville warningly called the “tyranny of the majority”, when an emotion-manipulated crowd elects an incompetent populist to make the law, the state defends itself in two ways.
The second line of defense at the level of daily management is the civil service, which makes the law living and effective, like a brain controlling and conducting all actions of other parts of the body. The elected public officials are the major obstacles to efficiency of the public service. Most often, they make radical changes in orientation such that will facilitate development in the public service to fail. Politicians in democracy come and go every four to five years. They have neither the time nor technical knowledge to write all the laws from scratch, and they rely on promoted, unselected officials. A German sociologist Max Weber described this professional bureaucracy as absolutely essential for the stable functioning of modern state. The only problem is, that there is lack of democratic accountability. Officials cannot be recorded in elections. However, on the other hand, it is their advantage and the reason why they keep the state from descending into chaos. We still have to remember the ultimate hierarchy. Although Montesquieu’s separation of powers guards the law and Weberian bureaucracy keeps the say in check, at the end of the day the official is a subordinate and if parliament legally passes a law to demolish this half-built law, and the courts do not deem it unconstitutional, the official must execute it, even if they consider it utter stupidity.
To conclude, yes, democracy chooses popularity and not competence. Election campaigns are marketing, but democracy is also the cooperation of a broad staff of educated officials with politicians. Thus we have: Political power which changes frequently, providing freshness, breaking duopoly and giving citizens a sense of influence And the bureaucratic power based on educated and experienced officials and ensures that the state does not fall apart during electoral shocks
The golden mean however does not consist of introducing pure meritocracy (because that breeds oligarchy and divisions), but of securing democracy with two pillars: Better education (e.g., John Dewey) so that voters can recognize populism and “pull the masks off” politicians. And a strong, professional civil service and institutions that stabilize the state when democracy chooses showmen.
This is almost the classic concept of a modern state under the rule of law. A model in which politicians and officials complement each other’s flaws. Classically, the state is protected by the law and the Constitution, and realistically, by competent officials who execute it. The law is just writing on a piece of paper, it only becomes living and effective when the bureaucratic apparatus (people with knowledge) puts it into practice, simultaneously halting the most destructive ideas of celebrity politicians.
The dispute over whether a state should be 100% democratic or 100% meritocratic is fundamentally flawed because one cannot expect different organs to perform the exact same function.
Bibliography:
- Archer, A., Cawston, A., Matheson, B., & Geuskens, M. (2020). Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power. Perspectives on Politics, 18(1), 27-42.
- Bolaji, K. A. (2014). Public Service and Democracy in Developing Societies: The Nigerian Experience. Journal of Power, Politics & Governance, 2(1). Retrieved from: ResearchGate (PDF).
- Higgins, M., & Drake, P. (2006). Celebrity and Politics. In P. D. Marshall (Ed.), The Celebrity Culture Reader. Routledge. Retrieved from: Strathprints (PDF).
- Jaquet, A., & Engeli, I. (2023). Celebrity Democracy and Epistemic Power. Perspectives on Politics. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from: Cambridge Core.
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5-28. Retrieved from: Sage Journals / Academia.edu.
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2018). Democracy and the Cartel Party Thesis: A Critique and a Defense. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: Google Books.
- Lafont, C. (2020). Representative Democracy as Defensible Epistocracy. American Political Science Review, 114(4). Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from: Cambridge Core.
- Somin, I. (2015). Rational Ignorance. In M. Fricker et al. (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Taylor & Francis. Retrieved from: Taylor & Francis.
- Street, J. (2004). Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6(4), 435-452.
- Institute for Humane Studies. (2021, March 24). Ilya Somin: Rational Ignorance [Video]. YouTube. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmJbNXl-HW8
- Learn Liberty. (2011, July 21). Why Are Politicians So Bad? The Myth of the Rational Voter [Video]. YouTube. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDUDAjCTv6w
Mentions:
- Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. Macmillan.
- Kuehnelt-Leddihn, E. von (1952). Liberty or Equality: The Challenge of Our Time. Caxton Printers.
- Plato. The Republic.
- Popper, K. R. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge.
- Sandel, M. J. (2020). The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good?. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper & Brothers.
- Tocqueville, A. de. (1835). Democracy in America.
- Weber, M. (1922). Economy and Society.
Related Articles
Related
Image over ideology: political communication in the era of social media
Lots of times, when I’m casually doomscrolling, I come across videos or pictures that refer to politics. Usually I laugh or get upset over how ridiculous they are but I don’t think much of it. They’re satire, of course, probably posted by a bored teenager, right?...
Demokracja nagradza kompetencje czy popularność?
Jak rozdzielana jest władza w państwie prawa i czy powinniśmy obawiać się niekompetentnych polityków? Czy demokracja może wciąż tworzyć dobry rząd, jeśli wyborcy wybierają liderów na podstawie perswazji, a nie eksperckiej wiedzy?Gdybyś miał wsiąść do samolotu podczas...
Za czym tak naprawdę tęsknią nacjonaliści?
Każdy ruch nacjonalistyczny opowiada historię o przeszłości, ale nie każda z tych historii włącza także stwierdzenie, że można ją odzyskać. Istnieje różnica między żałobą nad tym, co minęło, a upieraniem się, że można to przywrócić - między spojrzeniem wstecz a...